In 1969, tensions between communist China and the Soviet Union erupted in a series vicious and bloody border disputes. These clashes were the culmination of years of rising friction between the two nations, and in their aftermath, both sides seriously considered the prospect of a nuclear war.
The origins of the Sino-Soviet split can be attributed to the personalities and personal conflicts of the leaders involved. Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong got along well enough, although Mao nursed the impression that Stalin considered himself to be Mao’s senior.1 However, it was with Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, that relations truly soured. Ideologically, Mao could not countenance the way that he perceived Khrushchev as backing down in the Cuban Missile Crises, and concluded that he, Mao, was now most fit to lead the communist world.2 Perhaps the biggest affront to Mao, however, was Khrushchev’s Secret Speech. In it, Khrushchev denounced some of Stalin’s policies, one of the primary targets being collectivism. To Mao, this was also a criticism of him, as his Socialist High Tide had many similarities to Stalin’s collectivism.3
The result of Mao’s disillusionment with Soviet leadership was a gradual rift between the two countries. Not even Khrushchev’s replacement as leader of the Soviet Union by Alexei Kosygin helped temper relations.4 Early conflict came in the form of ideological barbs and increasingly un-subtle criticisms of the other nation.5 However, by the early to mid 1960s, the Chinese and Soviets found a new area for competition: disputed borders. Much of the border between northern China and eastern Siberia is formed by the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Hundreds of islands exist along both of these rivers, and the Chinese had long harbored claims to many of them. The Soviets saw the islands as theirs due to an old treaty that the Qing Empire had signed with Tzarist Russia which appeared to recognize Russian claims to the entire river, with Chinese territory only starting on the bank of their side.6 This would go against the normal method of dividing rivers, which would divide them along the deepest channel, giving essentially half to both sides. While issue of possessing a few uninhabited islands did not really bother the Chinese when Sino-Soviet relations were good, they provided a good opportunity to confront the Soviets as tensions escalated.
By the late 1960s, the Chinese and Soviets had both increased the military force along their border, and disputes and incursions were becoming more and more common.7 These were mostly non-lethal encounters, but they highlighted in the eyes of Chinese leadership the threat that the Soviets were building up their strength in an attempt to force a favorable conclusion to the border disputes.8 In response to this, Mao Zedong and the Chinese high command decided that a limited show of Chinese courage and resolve was called for.9 The plan was to lure a Soviet patrol into an ambush and thereby show that China was serious about enforcing its territorial claims. The place chosen was a small, uninhabited island in the Ussuri River called Damansky Island by the Russians and Zhenbao by the Chinese.10
The ambush occurred on March 2, 1969. About 300 Chinese troops snuck onto the island during the night and dug camouflaged foxholes; the next morning, a patrol of about 20 Chinese troops loudly headed towards the island. In response, a detachment of Soviet border guards set off for the island to intercept and drive off the Chinese patrol. When the Soviets got close, the Chinese opened fire on them, supported by the 300 concealed troops also opened fire. While the initial volley killed six Soviets, including their commanding officer, they also attracted the attention of a nearby Soviet unit, which arrived on the scene and eventually drove the Chinese troops off the island.11
If the Chinese intention with their ambush was to cow the Soviets, they failed spectacularly. Rather than withdraw, the Soviets planned their own counter-ambush. They sprung it on March 15, and brought a powerful combination of infantry, armor, artillery, and even helicopters to bear. In the course of a nine hour firefight, the Soviets again drove the Chinese from the island.12 The fighting on March 15 was substantially larger scale than that of March 2, but it was the aftermath of the battle that was most troubling for Chinese leaders. Seeing the Chinese actions as provocations, the Soviets made repeated threats of deploying nuclear weapons. The Soviets even went as far as gauging other governments around the world for their reactions to a Soviet nuclear strike on China.13 For their part, the Chinese responded in as firm a manner as they could, pointing out the immense cost that any large war with China would carry.14 Even as tensions were at their highest, the Soviets tried to secretly enter negotiations with the Chinese. The Chinese avoided answering these entreaties for some time, likely to give Mao more centralizing power for his Ninth Party Congress.15 However, even when they did answer, the Chinese were extremely worried about a Soviet attack, and even suspected the plane carrying Soviet negotiators of actually harboring Soviet commandoes or nuclear weapons. It was only when the plane touched down and no Spetsnaz operators jumped out did the Chinese relax and begin to ease tensions.16
1 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 7.
2 Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 227.
3 Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 51.
4 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173, 1176.
5 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173, 1176.
6 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173, 1180-1181.
7 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173, 1182.
8 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 24-25.
9 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 24.
10 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173, 1187.
11 Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173, 1188-1189.
12 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 25-26.
13 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 34.
14 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 47.
15 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 30.
16 Michael Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/, 46-52.
Works Consulted
Gerson, Michael. “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict – Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969,” November 23, 2010. https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2291220/the-sino-soviet-border-conflict/3051439/.
Robinson, Thomas W. “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes.” The American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175–1202. https://doi.org/10.2307/1957173.
Luthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
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